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proceedings...
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ELECTRONIC DATA RETRIEVAL
AUGUST 7, 1962, SAN FRANCISCO
Since M.U.L.L. is the official publication of the Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval, the Proceedings section is reserved
for the texts of the papers presented at the Committee's annual meetings.
They are reproduced here free of any editorial supervision or restrictions
and the views expressed are attributable solely to the authors.
In addition to those reprinted in this issue, the 1962 Proceedings
include the following papers which have appeared in prior issues of
M.U.L.L.:
December 1962:
Introduction, F. Reed Dickerson, 62D-244
Indexing-Achilles Heel of Legal Research? Charles K. Cobb, Jr.,
62D-245
New Frontiers of the Legal Technique, John C. Lyons, 62D-256
March 1963:
Project Lawsearch-A Non-Electronic Approach to Law Searching,
William H.B. Thomas, 63M-49
Electronic Aids to Estate Planning, Carl G. Paffendorf, 63M-54
Introduction to Second Panel Discussion
by Professor F. Reed Dickerson
Indiana University School of Law
For many years, a number of jurisprudes, some of whom call
themselves "legal realists," have been telling us two important things.
First, that the law is essentially a prediction of what judges are going
to do in specific controversies. Second, that in making such predictions
lawyers are more interested in how judges actually respond to particular
kinds of controversies than they are in the judges' own descriptions of
how they respond. Such descriptions are, of course, the kinds of statements of law that have so often been reflected in the law treatises.
In May, 1962, at the Second National Law and Electronics Conference held at Lake Arrowhead, two gentlemen, one a professor of
political science and the other a patent lawyer, described possible
methods for using mathematics and computers to assist in predicting
or guiding judicial decisions.
Because this seemed to promise a more scientific and efficient
way of doing what the legal realists have been telling us is our main
M.U.L.L.

job, you might have expected that these two gentlemen would have been
received with open arms, at least by the legal realists. Instead, several
of the attending jurisprudes, who I suspect would be happy to be classed
in that group, reacted somewhat as members of the DAR would to two
proponents of communism: The holy processes of the common law were
being subverted.
Frankly, I was surprised at their reaction and I am now convinced
that much of it was due to the lawyers' widespread fear of anything
mathematical or mechanized. On the other hand, I am also convinced
that this fear can be reduced to more wholesome proportions by a fuller
acquaintance with actual capabilities and limitations of modern mathematics and technology.
To assist us in this objective we are fortunate in having with us
both of the gentlemen to whom I referred. We are also fortunate in having
a distinguished judge to straighten them out if they seem to get out of
line.
Their topic will be Using Computers to Predict Supreme Court
Decisions, and let me hasten to add that, like most titles, it is incomplete. It fails, for instance, to cover the use of the same techniques,
not to assist in the prediction of judicial behavior, but to serve the judge
as a sort of mechanized consultant in applying the principles of stare
decisis.

A QUANTITATIVE RESTATEMENT OF LEGAL RULES
Fred Kort
University of Connecticut
Various areas of adjudication are controlled by rules of law
which make the decisions of cases dependent on unspecified combinations
of specified circumstances. Although such rules of law are not limited
to the field of American constitutional law, it is understandable that
rules of constitutional interpretation which have this characteristic will
readily attract attention. The fair trial rule, which has been used by the
Supreme Court of the United States in determining the requirements of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for state criminal
procedure, is such a rule of law. According to this rule, some combinations of the personal circumstances of the defendant and the procedural
circumstances of the case constitute a denial of due process, and consequently call for a decision in favor of the defendant. However, other
combinations of such circumstances do not amount to a denial of a
constitutional right, and therefore require a decision against the defendant, i.e., against the petitioner before the Court. The rule specifies
a general set of controlling circumstances, but it does not specify which
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